WHY ARE THE REMUNERATIONS 

OF BIG BOSSES EXPLODING ?

One name in particular caught the attention of the French press: that of Carlos Tavares, the general manager of the automobile group Stellantis (born from the merger between Fiat Chrystler and PSA Peugeot Citroën), supposed to receive 66 million euros in total compensation. in 2021, including a fixed portion of €19 million. This figure, made public during the intervening rounds of the presidential campaign, was deemed "shocking" both by the candidate of the National Rally, Marine Le Pen, and by the candidate president Emmanuel Macron, who also called for a cap on executive compensation at European level.

The case of Carlos Tavares indeed appears all the more controversial since, under the mandate of François Hollande, a law was adopted so that the employer's remuneration is subject to the approval of the shareholders. On April 13, the latter also opposed the payment of 66 million euros at the general meeting of the group. But the vote took place at the new headquarters located in the Netherlands, where this vote only has an advisory function... The CFDT central union representative, thus bitterly regretted the move: was for geographical neutrality, not for financial advantages…”

A decorrelation of performance

During the general assembly of the Stellantis group, the president John Elkann had justified this level of remuneration by explaining that he wanted to "reward the performance" of the manager who carried out the merger between Fiat Chrystler and PSA Peugeot Citroën.

Yet the question of whether to reward success financially, although it has been widely debated in psychology since the seminal work of Edward Deci, is not what is primarily at stake here. What is shocking is the level of this reward. How can we explain it? Is this a relevant practice in terms of management?

66 million euros for Carlos Tavares: the salary of the leader of Stellantis disputed (France 24, April 14, 2022).

In the United States, managers earned on average 254 times more than their employees in 2021, compared to 238 times in 2020. A level close to that observed in France. However, if the absolute level of this difference can legitimately shock, it is especially its evolution during the last decades which constitutes the most surprising phenomenon.

Indeed, this gap was only 1 to 20 in the United States in 1965. This was also the maximum pay gap recommended at the beginning of the 20th century by the famous banker JP Morgan, not well known for his activism. egalitarian. What can explain such inflation? This is certainly not a proportional increase in the talent and responsibilities of the big bosses: whatever the indicator chosen, nothing indicates that the performance of the leaders (and of the companies they lead) has multiplied by 20 since the 1960s.

Consanguinity of boards of directors

In fact, the explosion in the compensation of managers of listed companies is explained by the conjunction of two perverse effects. The first of these effects is the consanguinity of boards of directors and supervisory boards, known in France by the sweet name of "barbichette" , in reference to the nursery rhyme "I hold you, you hold me by the goatee", which becomes: “you are a member of my board, you vote my compensation, I am a member of your board, I vote your compensation”.

To legitimize executive compensation, some argue that there is a "market" for talent, and that compensation, however exuberant it may be, would correspond to the "market price" of skills. However, if such a market exists for the leaders of large groups, it is certainly not a free market and the price there is certainly not an objective measure of value. Indeed, the boards of directors of listed groups are often made up of individuals who are themselves leaders, and who often sit on several other boards.

There is therefore a form of collusion more or less displayed between the managers and those who evaluate their action and decide on their remuneration. Moreover, this situation is not specific to French capitalism (even if collusion between alumni of the same Grandes Ecoles and the same Grandes Corps tends to reinforce it), since it is found, for example, in the United States.

The consanguinity of the boards of directors and supervisory boards, one of the factors which maintains the salaries of the leaders on the rise.

We can thus explain the level of remuneration of the big bosses by the fact that they attribute it to themselves, through their administrators, with whom they share the same interests and the same networks. However, if this phenomenon can make it possible to understand the amount of remuneration, it does not explain their multiplication since the 1960s. Indeed, the endogamy of the instances of power is as old as the world, and nothing indicates that it be worse today than it was yesterday.

“Lake Wobegon effect”

To explain the explosion in executive compensation, we must therefore invoke a second perverse effect, much more formidable because it is largely counter-intuitive. It was from the 1990s that regulations gradually imposed disclosure of the levels of remuneration of the managers of listed companies. In the United States, this took the form of a new rule enacted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1992. In France, it is the NRE law of May 15, 2001, revised by the financial security law of August 1, 2003 which fixed this framework.

In both cases, the objective was the same: to better inform shareholders about executive compensation, with the underlying assumption that if this compensation became public, it would remain contained. However, paradoxically, it is exactly the opposite that has happened: it is the publication of salaries that has caused their inflation.

Indeed, as soon as the remuneration is public, it becomes a measure of the value of the leaders and therefore an issue. As long as it was secret, it did not make it possible to compare individuals and therefore remained a purely private matter. Having become public, it imposes itself as the standard of their talent. When a listed company appoints a new leader and decides to pay him less than his predecessor, everyone knows it, and we will deduce that he is not as capable as the one he replaces. Similarly, if the leader of a company is paid less than the average for his industry, everyone knows it, and we will deduce that he is not among the most talented.

It is because remuneration is public that all leaders seek to earn more than the average and that all boards of directors are constantly paying them better. Indeed, a director who would publicly doubt the competence of the manager would cause a collapse of the share price. Conversely, to positively influence shareholder value, a board of directors has an interest in giving all the most patent, measurable and most visible signs of the extreme confidence it has in the exceptional talent of the manager: this is what he does when he decides to increase it. Therefore, once public, executive compensation becomes instrumentalized as both a measurement tool and a mechanism of influence.

The phenomenon of instrumentalization of the average is known in the United States as the "Lake Wobegon effect", named after the fictional town of Lake Wobegon, where, as the legend goes, "all women are strong, all men are beautiful and all the children are above average”. If it is impossible for everyone to be better than the average, the fact that everyone seeks to be so causes their inflation.

A simple solution for a recent anomaly

What to remember from all that ? In the light of history, the explosion in the remuneration of the bosses of large companies remains an anomaly, and it is a recent anomaly (the French economist Thomas Piketty condemns “meritocratic extremism” in this regard). From a managerial point of view, the current levels of remuneration are not justified, because for a long time companies have been very well managed without their bosses being so handsomely paid.

Moreover, such pay gaps cause a deep feeling of inequity, at the risk of general demotivation, which is much more detrimental to company performance than a very hypothetical erosion of executive talent. As American billionaire Warren Buffett slyly puts it:

"When a leader with a reputation for excellence meets an industry with a reputation for difficulty, it's usually the industry that retains its reputation."

Consequently, if we want to put an end to this historical anomaly that is the explosion of the salaries of big bosses (or that of movie stars and sports champions), the conclusion that must be drawn is clear: we must make these salaries secret. As soon as they are secret, remuneration will cease to be a measure of the value of individuals, and therefore to be an issue. Of course, nothing says that by becoming confidential, remuneration will go down to more reasonable levels (for that, the law would have to impose it or the shareholders would have to demand it), but at the very least they will have fewer reasons to 'increase.

Remains a major obstacle: it is difficult to see how public opinion, scandalized by the current levels of these remunerations, could accept that we decide to hide them. I invite our most pedagogical readers to solve this thorny problem.

According to Frédéric Fréry

Professor of Strategy, ESCP Business School, CentraleSupélec – University of Paris-Saclay in TheConversation.